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EUROPEAN BANK RESOLUTION:  
MAKING IT WORK! 
INTERIM REPORT 
 OF THE 
CEPS TASK FORCE ON IMPLEMENTING FINANCIAL SECTOR RESOLUTION 
Introduction 
Following the financial crisis of 2007-08, global leaders (G20, 2009) launched a sweeping 
reform of banking regulation and supervision1  designed to reduce: i) the probability that 
banks would fail,2 ii) systemic risk3 and iii) the impact that the failure of a bank could have on 
taxpayers, financial markets and the economy at large. 
To achieve this third objective, policy-makers embarked on a policy agenda to end “too big to 
fail” conundrum and improve the ability to resolve global systemically important financial 
institutions (G-SIFIs). The aim was to create a regime in which financial institutions, especially 
global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), could ‘fail’ without significant adverse effects 
on financial markets or the economy at large and without cost to the taxpayer. 
Now that this regime is largely in place, attention must turn to implementation. This report 
outlines, principally with respect to the EU, key steps that authorities, banks and financial 
market infrastructures (FMIs) should take to make resolution effective. Particular emphasis is 
placed on how the bail-in tool should be employed, as this tool is most likely to feature 
prominently in the resolution plans for significant banking institutions in the EU. 
1. The institutional framework for resolution is largely in place 
Over the past five years, the principal jurisdictions (i.e. home authorities for G-SIBs) have 
established the legislative and institutional framework required for an effective resolution 
regime. In 2011, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) laid out the “Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (hereafter the “key attributes”) (FSB, 2011).4. To 
                                                   
1 See Lannoo (2015) for a discussion of the post-financial crisis legislative framework. 
2 To reduce the probability that banks would fail, policy-makers increased capital requirements and 
raised the quality of capital that could be used to meet the more stringent requirement. They also 
introduced a global liquidity standard for the first time. In addition, they took steps to improve the 
quality of supervision, both via institutional change (such as the introduction of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, discussed in more detail below) and the introduction of new supervisory tools, such as 
stress-testing, and the conduct of thematic reviews and recommendations on key topics, such as risk 
governance and data integrity. Finally, policy-makers required banks to develop recovery plans that 
outlined how they would deal with extreme stress.  
3 To reduce systemic risk, policy-makers introduced the concept of macro-prudential supervision and 
established systemic risk boards at the national (e.g. the Financial Stability Oversight Council [FSOC] 
in the US and the Financial Policy Committee [FPC] in the UK), EU (European Systemic Risk Board 
[ESRB]) and global (Financial Stability Board [FSB]) levels. In addition, policy-makers took steps to 
strengthen markets, notably the derivatives market through the introduction of mandatory clearing. 
However, this concept potentially makes central counterparties (CCPs) a single point of failure, 
increasing the importance that the CCP itself be resolvable (see chapter 2). 
4The FSB subsequently revised and updated this framework; see (FSB, 2014). 
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implement the key attributes the principal jurisdictions enacted appropriate legislation and 
designated or established resolution authorities. Compliance has been especially high in 
jurisdictions that are home to the 30 G-SIBs (FSB, 2015b) or host to the principal foreign 
branches and subsidiaries of such G-SIBs (see Table 1).5 
Table 1. Principal G-SIB jurisdictions are in compliance with FSB key attributes 
Home jurisdiction  Home resolution authority 
Compliance with 
FSB key attributes 
G-SIBs 
(Home) 
Important 
as host 
EU Euro area SRB/NRAs 
 
8   
UK Bank of England  4   
Sweden Riksgälden  1  
Switzerland FINMA 
 
2  
United States  FDIC 
 
8   
Japan  FSA 
 
3   
China  PBC / CBRC 
 
4  
Hong Kong SAR HKMA    * 0   
Singapore MAS    * 0   
Total    30  
* Following implementation of planned legislation in 2016. 
The EU plays a particularly important role in resolution reform, as it is home to 13 of the 30 G-
SIBs and host to practically all the others. In the EU the banking recovery and resolution 
Directive (BRRD) – supplemented by the EBA’s implementing measures -- effectively 
transposes the FSB key attributes into EU law.6 The BRRD is applicable to all credit institutions 
incorporated in a member state of the EU, including EU subsidiaries of third-country banking 
groups. The deadline for the transposition of the BRRD into national law was set at 31 
December 2014. By the end of 2015, however, five member states including the Czech Republic, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Romania and Sweden, had not yet fully transposed the rules into 
national laws, and were consequently referred by the European Commission to the Court of 
Justice (European Commission, 2015). 
The BRRD requires each member state to designate or establish a national resolution authority 
(NRA), and practically all member states had done so as of 30 September 2015 (see Annex 1). 
Within the eurozone the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) ties these NRAs together under 
the aegis of the Single Resolution Board (SRB). 7  The SRM complements the SSM (Single 
                                                   
5 Most of the foreign branches and subsidiaries (in terms of asset size) of any G-SIB are located in a 
jurisdiction that is home for another G-SIB (e.g. the UK is the host jurisdiction for a number of the 
branches and subsidiaries of G-SIBs headquartered in the United States).  
6 EBA implementing measures include draft Regulatory Technical Standards [RTS], draft Implementing 
technical Standards, Guidelines and Opinions. 
7  OJ L 225 of 30.7.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0806&from=EN). 
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Supervisory Mechanism)8: together the SRM and SSM are implementing banking union within 
the eurozone. 
The Directive requires each credit institution to draw up -- and its competent authority to 
assess -- a recovery plan.9 This plan will be implemented by the institution itself, on its own 
initiative, if its financial situation deteriorates. In case this is not sufficient, and certain 
performance criteria are triggered by the institution,10 the BRRD also equips the competent 
authority with “early intervention powers" (sometimes also called “crisis prevention 
measures”). These entitle the supervisor to order ‘troubled’ institutions 11  to implement 
measures as set out in the recovery plan or take certain additional steps. Such additional steps 
may include changes to the bank’s business strategies and/or legal or operational structure 
that the authorities consider necessary to prevent the bank’s economic condition from 
deteriorating further. The supervisor may also require “the management body of the 
institution to draw up a plan for negotiation on restructuring of debt with some or all of its 
creditors”.12  
Should the management not succeed in arresting the deterioration in the bank’s condition, the 
supervisor has the right to remove the management of the institution 13  and appoint a 
temporary administrator (TA), who would be empowered to conduct the affairs of the 
institution.14 The TA would be able to change the institution’s business strategy and the TA 
would be required – to the extent it is reasonable to do so -- to seek a private-sector solution to 
                                                   
8 For Lannoo (2014) for a discussion of the SSM. 
9  Article 5, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN); (EBA, 2013 & 2014b). 
10  Article 27, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN); (EBA, 2015d). 
11 According to the BRRD, authorities can take early intervention measures if “an institution infringes 
or, due, inter alia, to a rapidly deteriorating financial condition, including deteriorating liquidity 
situation, increasing level of leverage, non-performing loans or concentration of exposures as assessed 
on the basis of a set of triggers, which may include the institution’s own funds requirement plus 1.5 
percentage points, is likely to infringe the requirements” for continuing authorisation. Article 27, OJ L 
173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN). The EBA advises authorities to consider 
the following as triggers for early intervention: 1) an overall SREP (supervisory review and evaluation 
process) score of 4, or an overall score of 3 with a score of 4 in certain individual items (internal 
governance and institution-wide controls; business model and strategy; capital adequacy; and liquidity 
adequacy); 2) material changes in key SREP indicators that could cause a review of the SREP score; and 
3) significant events that could cause a review of the SREP score, such as major operational risk events; 
a deterioration in the amount of eligible liabilities and own funds; signals that asset quality or specific 
portfolios/assets should be reviewed; significant outflow of funds; unexpected loss, without 
replacement, of senior management/key staff; significant rating downgrades (EBA 2014d). 
12  Article 27.1(e), OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN). Note that the institution should have 
already outlined the basis for such a renegotiation in its recovery plan. 
13  Article 28, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN) 
14  Article 29, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN) 
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the recapitalisation of an institution.15 If such efforts are not successful, the TA may write down 
equity and write down and/or convert into common equity the bank’s additional tier 1 and 
tier 2 capital.16 Finally, the TA is also tasked with preparing the institution to enter resolution.17  
If the bank does enter resolution, then the BRRD provides the resolution authorities with a full 
array of resolution powers, including the right to bail in (write down and/or convert to equity) 
certain liabilities of the bank upon the entry of the bank into resolution, subject to the safeguard 
that no creditor will be made worse off than it would have become, had the bank-in-resolution 
been liquidated under normal insolvency procedures (see Box 1). 
Box 1. No creditor worse off than in liquidation 
“No creditor worse off than in liquidation” is a safeguard for creditors. Its goal is to ensure that 
they will get under resolution at least as much as they would have received if the authorities 
had decided to liquidate the bank rather than apply resolution measures. Any compensation 
due to creditors shall be payable by the Resolution Fund, based on an independent valuation.18 
To evaluate whether the “no creditor worse off than in liquidation” principle has been met, an 
ex-post valuation needs to be carried out by independent valuer as soon as possible after 
resolution actions have taken effect to determine whether any difference exists between the 
treatment that shareholder and creditors would have received had the bank entered normal 
insolvency procedures and the actual treatment they have received through the resolution 
process. 19 
 
The Directive effectively creates a hierarchy that dictates the order – subject to certain 
exceptions and national discretions -- in which liabilities shall be bailed in and losses allocated. 
Within each (liquidation) class of liabilities, there should be pari passu treatment (subject again 
to the exercise of certain national discretion). Note that the power of the resolution authority 
to bail in liabilities extends – with some clearly delineated exceptions – all the way up the 
creditor hierarchy to deposits. Within the deposit tranche, guaranteed deposits have what 
amounts to a super preference. If bail-in does reach the guaranteed deposit tranche, the deposit 
guarantee scheme (DGS), not the insured depositor, will be subject to bail-in and bear the loss 
attributable to insured deposits (up to €100,000 per depositor).20  
                                                   
15  Article 32(1)(b), OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN) 
16 But not other forms of MREL or TLAC, even if in subordinated debt form. These may be bailed in 
only if the bank enters resolution. 
17  These are tasks that the supervisor is empowered under Article 27 to direct the institution to 
undertake. Article 27, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN). 
18 Article 101, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN) 
19 Article 74, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN) 
20 Article 50, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN). To reinforce the point on the creditor 
hierarchy, the BRRD mandates that a distinction be made between senior and subordinated debt when 
converting such debts into equity, so that each euro of senior debt is converted into a higher number of 
common equity shares. 
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The BRRD also requires resolution authorities to conduct resolvability assessments, draw up 
resolution plans and set an institution-specific requirement for the bank’s minimum 
requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – the amount of long-term 
(remaining maturity greater than one year) liabilities with high loss absorbing capacity or for 
which bail-in is especially feasible and credible.  
Although the BRRD mandates that member states set up a resolution fund,21 recourse to that 
fund may occur only after 8% of the bank’s liabilities have been bailed in. And, any such 
recourse is limited to 5% of the bank’s liabilities as well as subject to state aid rules. 22 
Furthermore, the BRRD and SRM Regulation constrain the ability of member states to bail out 
their banks. Although member states are allowed to extend “extraordinary public financial 
support” as a preventive measure to recapitalise banks that are in need of new capital but 
unable to raise it privately in the market, either as response to stress-test results or in the 
context of a systemic crisis, any such assistance is subject to EU state aid rules and to prior 
approval by the European Commission, and after other resolution tools have been exhausted.23 
Finally, the Directive and the SRM Regulation create the basis for international cooperation 
within the SRM, within the EU and with the authorities in third countries. This is especially 
important, as the EU’s principal banks all operate across national borders via branches and/or 
subsidiaries. 
Within the SRM the SRB becomes in effect both the home and the host resolution authority. 
The SRB has the responsibility for all banks supervised directly by the ECB and all cross-border 
banks to assess their resolvability and develop their resolution plans as well as establish each 
bank’s level of MREL. The SRB will replace the national resolution authorities in in crisis 
management groups (resolution colleges). The SRB will act as the home resolution authority 
for banks and banking groups headquartered in a eurozone member state, and it will act as 
host resolution authority with respect to branches and subsidiaries in the eurozone of banks 
and banking groups headquartered outside the eurozone. In such global groups, the SRB will 
determine, along with resolution authorities from other jurisdictions, the approach that will 
be taken to resolving the banks, should this become necessary. However, national resolution 
authorities remain responsible for implementing the SRB’s decisions. 
Authorities should use crisis management groups to establish a preferred path. Authorities have also 
established, in line with FSB guidance, a global crisis management group (CMG) for each G-
                                                   
21  Article 100, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN). Similar to national funds mandated by 
the BRRD, the SRM regulation establishes the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is owned and 
administered by the SRB. The SRF is funded by regular ex-ante and extraordinary ex-post contributions 
from all institutions to which the Regulation applies, and is to reach, by 2024, 1% of the amount of 
covered deposits of all these institutions. Contributions are raised annually by member states and 
transferred under the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Single Resolution Fund to the SRF. The SRF 
is owned and administered by the SRB. For an estimation of the funds required by the SRF, see De Groen 
and Gros (2015). 
22  Article 44(5)(a), OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN). See also Article 37(10)(a). The a priori 
valuation of Article 36 should be used to measure the quantum of liabilities including own funds when 
calculating the percentage. For institutions with less than € 900 billion of assets, the threshold may be 
20% of risk-weighted assets.  
23  Articles 56 to 58, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN). 
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SIB. The CMG should include supervisory authorities, central banks, resolution authorities, 
finance ministries and the public authorities responsible for deposit guarantee schemes in both 
home and host jurisdictions for entities material to the group.24  
The principal task of the CMGs is to establish an institution-specific resolution plan that can 
guide the actions of the authorities in home and host jurisdictions, if all or part of the banking 
group were to require resolution. Such plans must work both at the level of each individual 
credit institution within the group as well as at the level of the group as a whole. 
As a practical matter, resolution plans are more likely to succeed, if home and host authorities 
plan together on how they would coordinate their activities with respect to the banking group, 
if resolution were to be required. In other words, resolution is more likely to be feasible, if 
home and host authorities have developed in advance a ‘preferred path’ that outlines how 
they would approach the resolution of the banking group in question. Indeed, without such a 
preferred path, it is difficult to see how authorities can reasonably conduct the resolvability 
assessment that they are required to perform. And, there is much to be said for communicating 
that preferred path not only to the banking group concerned but to markets more generally. 
That will serve to put investors on notice that they will in fact be bailed in and are therefore at 
risk, if the bank does enter resolution. Publication of the key features of the preferred path may 
also increase the likelihood that the authorities will in fact act in the manner outlined by the 
preferred path. That in turn may increase the willingness of investors to create a private-sector 
solution (if the entry into resolution is certain to result in bail-in, rather than lead to bail-out, 
the creditors exposed to bail-in should be more inclined to take the opportunity to negotiate a 
restructuring).  
Even the simplest of corporate structures may require international coordination and 
cooperation.  Take a bank headquartered in jurisdiction A with a branch in jurisdiction B. If 
host jurisdiction B takes a territorial approach to resolution, the authorities in jurisdiction B 
may be required, or have the option, to resolve the bank’s branch in jurisdiction B separately 
from the parent bank. If the host country exercises that option (i.e. insists on what might be 
called “my point of entry”), this may dictate the course that the home authority will have to 
take with respect to the parent bank. If the host elects to liquidate the branch, the home may 
not be able to avoid liquidating the parent bank as well. Home authorities therefore need to 
gain some assurance from host authorities that the latter will not exercise what amounts to a 
nuclear option. This will be particularly important for EU banks that have branches in the 
United States, as such branches are often material to the EU bank and the US has under its 
laws the option to follow the territorial approach to resolution (Lee, 2014).25 
International cooperation is also important for banking groups organised with a parent in one 
jurisdiction and one or more subsidiaries in other jurisdiction(s). There are two principal 
approaches to resolution of such groups: multiple point of entry (MPE) and single point of 
entry (SPE). Under the MPE approach, resolution powers are applied at the operating 
subsidiary level and can involve two or more resolution authorities. Under the SPE approach 
the home jurisdiction resolution authority applies resolution powers at the top-level parent or 
holding company level and directs the resolution of the group as a whole.  
                                                   
24 Within the EU, the BRRD calls for the creation of a resolution group for each significant bank. 
25 Also note that home countries may also give host countries such an option, if they do not elect to 
require parent banks to deduct their investment in their subsidiary according to Article 49 (2) , OJ L 176 
of 27.6.2013 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&from=EN).  
EUROPEAN BANK RESOLUTION: MAKING IT WORK! | 7 
Both approaches presume a certain degree of cooperation among home and host authorities.26 
However, as a practical matter, each resolution authority will give primary consideration to 
its own jurisdiction (indeed, they may be required by law to do so).27 To facilitate home and 
host cooperation, the FSB’s standard on total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) includes a 
framework for internal TLAC, whereby the loss-absorbing capacity held at the level of a G-
SIB’s resolution entity in the home jurisdiction is committed to the G-SIB’s material 
subsidiaries in host jurisdictions. This ‘internal TLAC’ is intended to provide confidence to 
host authorities that loss-absorbing capacity will be made available to subsidiaries in their 
jurisdiction.  
Internal TLAC therefore assures host authorities that they can recapitalise the operating 
subsidiary within their jurisdiction without having to rely on the parent to infuse new capital 
at the point at which the subsidiary reaches non-viability. This is conducive to the subsidiary’s 
continuing to perform critical economic functions and may enable the subsidiary to continue 
as a going concern without entering resolution at all.  
Internal TLAC also provides the host subsidiary with the wherewithal to resist the contagion 
that might arise, if the subsidiary’s parent and/or one or more of the subsidiary’s sister 
affiliates were to enter resolution. To ensure that the capital of the subsidiary (should it remain 
healthy) cannot be drained to support affiliates and/or the parent, were the affiliate(s) and/or 
the parent to enter resolution, host jurisdictions may supplement internal TLAC requirements 
by imposing restrictions on inter-affiliate transactions28 and on the ability of the subsidiary to 
pay dividends or make distributions.29 
In effect, the requirement that each material entity has its own TLAC amounts to a requirement 
that parents provide strength to their subsidiaries up front. This gives rise to four further 
issues:  
1. To what extent does the subsidiary’s strength (TLAC) have to come from the parent 
alone, or can the subsidiary also issue TLAC instruments to third-party (external to the 
group) investors. Both the Federal Reserve (2015) and the Bank of England (2015) have 
expressed a strong preference for the former. Such a stance certainly simplifies 
resolution: bail-in simply changes the form in which the parent holds its investment in 
the subsidiary (e.g. from T2 capital to common equity). That avoids the need to 
consider a change in control and greatly diminishes the significance of the actual terms 
on which the TLAC instrument is written down and/or converted to common equity. 
However, such a solution is not open to groups where an operating bank is the top-
level parent company. For these entities the resolution plan must accommodate the 
possibility that the bail-in will result in a change in control to third-party external 
investors (see below). As such plans are developed, it would seem sensible to allow 
groups to apply such plans to their subsidiaries, particularly where the group does not 
currently hold 100% of the subsidiary’s common equity. This would be much more 
consistent with an overall MPE approach to resolution and would allow additional 
flexibility with respect to an SPE approach. 
                                                   
26 For a discussion of MPE and SPE approaches see (Huertas, 2015). 
27 For a discussion of the issues facing a host country supervisor see (Tarullo, 2012 and 2015). 
28 For example, such restrictions apply to the bank subsidiaries of the intermediate holding company 
that large foreign banking organisations are required to form in the United States. 
29 This will be the case for IHCs owned by FBOs in the United States. See Tarullo (2015). 
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2. To what extent can the group effectively limit its liability for the entity entering 
resolution to the amount of its investment in the entity? If losses at the entity entering 
resolution exceed the amount of MREL issued to the parent holding company, is the 
entity entering resolution effectively severed from the rest of the group, as the doctrine 
of limited liability would imply?30 Note that the BRRD allows group financial support, 
but does not make it mandatory.31  
3. What triggers resolution at the parent holding company – the entry of a subsidiary into 
resolution, or the failure of the parent holding company to meet minimum 
consolidated capital requirements? It is possible that the parent holding company 
would still be in compliance with minimum capital requirements even if losses at the 
wholesale bank led to the loss of the holding company’s entire MREL investment. This 
is particularly likely to be the case, if the holding company’s liability is limited to the 
amount of its investment in the bank subsidiary, so that the write-off of its investment 
in the failed subsidiary results in the deconsolidation of that subsidiary from the group. 
In such a case, what is the rationale for putting the holding company into resolution? 
Does the answer differ depending on which subsidiary has entered resolution? 
4. If a holding company does enter resolution, what is the resolution process? Specifically, 
what do investors receive and what rights do they have? As the parent holding 
company is an ordinary business corporation, to what extent can the resolution process 
be modelled on ordinary bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings?32 Note that the closer 
the resolution process for the parent holding company comes to ordinary insolvency 
proceedings, the greater will be the certainty on the part of investors as to what 
recoveries they might make, if the holding company were to enter resolution. This will 
in turn facilitate the ability of banking groups to place instruments qualifying for 
treatment as MREL with investors. 
2. The focus should now be on planning for resolution 
In drawing up resolution plans, authorities and banks need to think through what needs to be 
accomplished – without recourse to the taxpayer -- during and after a ‘resolution weekend’ in 
order to assure continuity in the provision of critical economic functions as well as avoid 
significant adverse effects on financial markets and the economy at large. This process will 
                                                   
30 If so, bail-in at the subsidiary that has entered resolution must move up the creditor hierarchy and 
begin to apportion losses at the bank level to the bank’s third-party creditors. This may in turn adversely 
affect financial markets, making it all the more important that the authorities avoid forbearance.  
31  Article 19, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN). 
32 In such processes: 
 A receiver or administrator is appointed to run the business in the interest of the creditors.  
 A stay is placed on payments and distributions to shareholders and creditors. 
 Creditors are given receivership certificates entitling them (in strict order of seniority) to any 
proceeds realised by the administrator from running the business.  
 Losses are apportioned in reverse order of seniority, starting with equity, then proceeding 
upward through the creditor hierarchy to preferred stock (additional tier 1 capital), 
subordinated debt (Tier 2 capital) and senior debt. 
 Creditors have various rights, including the right to propose a reorganisation plan.  
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identify obstacles to resolution and develop recommendations on how to remove such 
obstacles. 
The authorities must plan for all three stages of resolution: pulling the trigger (the entry into 
resolution), stabilising the bank and restructuring the bank (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Resolution has three stages 
 
  
 
   
         
 
Source: Author. 
Authorities should prepare themselves to pull the trigger promptly at the point of non-viability. The 
first stage of the resolution process is the decision to pull the trigger. The decision to pull the 
trigger has two aspects: a determination that the bank meets the criteria for entering resolution 
and the selection of the resolution strategy and tools to be employed. These two decisions have 
to be taken together. It makes no sense to make a determination that a significant bank should 
enter resolution unless the authorities have a resolution plan in mind and are ready to execute 
it.  
Five questions stand out in connection with pulling the trigger: i) What criteria should be 
used? ii) What resolution tools, if any, should the resolution authority employ? iii) Who should 
make the decision? iv) When should the decision be implemented? v) What should be 
communicated to the market at the time the decision is made? 
What criteria should be used? The BRRD states that resolution action shall be taken on conditions 
that the institution is “failing or is likely to fail”, that there is no reasonable alternative private-
sector measure or supervisory action (e.g. write down or conversion of capital instruments) 
that would prevent the failure within a reasonable timeframe, and that resolution is necessary 
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in the public interest (e.g. to prevent adverse effects on the financial system). 33  These 
conditions are determined sequentially, with the competent authority (in the case of the SSM, 
the ECB) determining that the institution is “failing or likely to fail” and the resolution 
authority (in the case of the SRM, the SRB) determining the subsequent two conditions that 
there are no alternate private solutions and that a resolution action is necessary in the public 
interest. 
There is general agreement that a bank should indeed be put into resolution when it reaches 
the point of non-viability (PONV), i.e. the point at which it is decided that the institution would 
“cease to be viable” if eligible capital instruments were not written down or converted.34 There 
are several points to note about this definition: 
1. The decision must be based on an a priori valuation of the bank’s assets and liabilities.35 
The BRRD requires that a “fair, prudent and realistic” valuation of the institution’s 
assets and liabilities be conducted by an independent valuer36 not affiliated with public 
entities including the resolution authority, in order to determine whether conditions 
for resolution are met and if so, what resolution tools and to what extent they should 
be applied. Valuation shall also ensure that any losses on the assets are fully recognised 
at resolution. 
This represents a considerable challenge, given the short time frame and given the 
scope and scale of a bank’s operations (especially for G-SIBs with substantial cross-
border operations). A regulatory-adjusted accounting valuation requires the valuer to 
apply assumptions and judgements that might deviate from the management’s 
opinions, while the existing valuation system and processes of the bank also need to 
be adapted in order to facilitate the resolution evaluation.  
As a practical matter, the authorities may well need to have recourse to their ability to 
make in circumstances of urgency a provisional valuation. This can also serve the basis 
for choosing resolution actions (see below), provided that a buffer is included for 
additional losses. 
2. The bank may have positive net worth at the PONV (as determined by the a priori 
valuation). This is especially likely to be the case for banks that rely on short-term 
funding from wholesale sources, for such investors may be more likely to run on a 
bank that they consider weak. In such a case, the bank is more likely to run out of 
liquidity before its capital is run down. Note that this has implications for the bail-in 
of MREL/TLAC instruments such as T2 capital (see below). 
3. Access to emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) may obscure the PONV and lead to 
forbearance. By refinancing itself at the central bank, the distressed bank not only 
maintains its liquidity, but also benefits from the viability test that the central bank 
conducts prior to granting ELA. This makes it difficult for the supervisor to argue that 
                                                   
33 Article 32, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN). 
34  Recital 81, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN). 
35  Article 36, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN). 
36 The EBA (2015c) has published the final draft RTS on the general criteria for the legal compliance of 
independence of valuers. 
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the bank has reached the PONV, especially if the supervisor is part of the central bank. 
That in turn increases the likelihood of forbearance. 
This ‘stay of execution’ allows, indeed may even accelerate, the run on the distressed 
bank. That in turn would potentially increase losses to holders of ‘reserve capital’, such 
as subordinated debt (Tier 2 capital). 
Banking union may be particularly prone to this risk, for ELA remains the 
responsibility of national central banks (NCBs), subject to an appropriate member state 
guarantee of the institution’s obligations and no objection from the ECB on monetary 
policy grounds only. This means that any costs of, and risks arising from, the provision 
of ELA are incurred by the relevant NCB (and its member state). Although the SSM 
confirms to the NCB and the ECB that the bank meets minimum capital requirements, 
it is the NCB that makes the viability assessment in connection with granting ELA, not 
the ECB.37 This increases the likelihood of forbearance.  
Authorities should therefore consider transferring responsibility for ELA within the 
eurozone to the ECB. As an input to such a decision, the Single Supervisory Board (SSB) 
should provide an opinion to the Governing Council of the ECB regarding the 
distressed bank’s viability.38  
What resolution tools, if any, should the resolution authorities employ? As outlined above, the 
determination that a bank is failing or likely to fail, is only part one of “pulling the trigger”. 
Just as important are the resolution plan and the resolution tools. That is reflected in the BRRD 
– the decision to pull the trigger is taken with the knowledge of the resolution plan and 
resolution tools that the resolution authority intends to employ. 
Figure 2. The process of “pulling the trigger” involves both the supervisor and the resolution 
authority 
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Source: Author. 
 
                                                   
37 However, the ECB may limit the total amount of ELA available, especially in systemic situations. For 
a full statement of ELA procedures see (ECB, 2014). 
38 Similar proposals are made in Gortsos (2015), Lastra (2015) and Huertas (2014a).  
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Logically, the resolution authority needs first to determine whether it is the public interest to 
follow normal bankruptcy or insolvency procedures or to employ resolution tools (see Figure 
2). The smaller and simpler the failing institution, the less likely it is that the bank is performing 
functions critical to the economy and the more likely it is that the resolution authority will opt 
for normal insolvency procedures, particularly if the deposit guarantee scheme is able to 
quickly pay out insured depositors. 
In contrast, if the failing bank is performing functions critical to the economy, the more likely 
it is that the resolution authority will find it in the public interest to employ resolution tools, 
either singly or in combination, in executing the resolution plan. The resolution tool kit 
includes: 
 Sale of the institution. The resolution authority may sell the failing institution as a whole 
to a third party without the consent of shareholders. Such a sale may take the form of 
a sale of shares (with the proceeds going to the shareholders) or the sale of substantially 
all of the failing institution’s assets and liabilities (with the proceeds going to the 
institution).39 
 Transfer assets to bridge institution. The resolution authority may transfer the shares of 
the failing institution or some portion of its assets (together with an amount of 
liabilities less than or equal in value to the amount of assets transferred) to a special 
purpose, limited-life bridge institution owned by the authorities. Such a bridge 
institution would be authorised to conduct banking activities, pending its sale to a third 
party or until such time as it wound down its operations.40 
 Asset separation. The resolution authority may transfer assets, rights and liabilities from 
the failing bank to a separate asset-management vehicle under the ownership and 
direction of the authorities. Such a separation may help the authorities realise greater 
value from the assets, and such asset-management vehicles have proven particularly 
effective in cases where they have received transfers of assets from two or more banks.  
 Bail-in. As outlined above, the BRRD empowers the resolution authority to write down 
and/or convert into equity the liabilities of the bank. As noted above, this tool is most 
likely to be relevant to the resolution of significant banks and the focus of this chapter 
is to assess how this tool can be used to facilitate resolution of such banks.  
Note that prior to implementing any of these tools, the resolution authority will have had to 
commission and complete an independent a priori valuation of the bank’s assets to determine 
the amount of additional losses that should be recognised and (in the case of the bail-in tool) 
the amount of CET1 capital that must be created (via write-down or conversion) to restore 
CET1 capital to a level that will enable the stabilised bank to gain the confidence of the 
market.41 
                                                   
39 The asset-sale route is particularly suited to situations where the failing institution may be subject to 
contingent liabilities such as legal claims. 
40 Note that the bridge institution tool may be used to transfer insured deposits or deposits generally to 
a third party. As deposits have preference under the BRRD, it is possible for the resolution authority to 
cherry-pick the best of the failing bank’s unencumbered assets and then match them against the deposit 
liabilities to be transferred to the bridge institution. This potentially permits depositors to have 
continued access to their accounts, particularly if the bridge institution is immediately sold to a third 
party. 
41  Article 46, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN); in practice, the competent authority will 
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2.1 Who should make the decision to pull the trigger?  
As a practical matter, however, pulling the trigger will require a high degree of coordination 
between the supervisor (who generally has primary responsibility to determine whether the 
bank is failing or likely to fail) 42  and the resolution authority (which generally has the 
responsibility to decide whether the bank should be liquidated or resolved under a plan 
employing one or more of the BRRD’s resolution tools). 
Note that additional parties must be involved in the trigger decision, if the resolution authority 
wishes to employ certain tools, particularly those involving the use of public resources.43 
Given the limited amount of time available to stabilise a bank once the trigger has been pulled, 
it is essential that the resolution authority has in place all the necessary approvals prior to the 
trigger being pulled. Note that these approvals should include not only those necessary in the 
bank’s home jurisdiction, but also those required in the principal foreign jurisdictions in which 
the bank has branches and/or subsidiaries. 
Figure 3. Adopting the actual resolution scheme is a complex process 
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 Commission has 12 hours to make 
proposal to Council 
  
 
  
SRB has 8 hours to 
revise 
 SRB 
  ECB 
   Commission 
 
 Council 
    NRAs 
Source: Author. 
                                                   
determine the capital requirement, since ultimately it is responsible for granting the institution a 
banking licence. 
42  Article 32, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN). Note, however, that the resolution 
authority may also make this determination (Article. 32.2). 
43 In the United States, for example, the decision to employ the Orderly Liquidation Authority under 
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the prior approval of the FDIC itself (two-thirds of its board of 
directors), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (two-thirds majority) and then the 
decision by the Secretary of the Treasury “in consultation with the President” as to whether to appoint 
the FDIC as receiver for the financial company in danger of default. In the EU, the Directorate General 
for Competition in the European Commission must similarly approve any state aid and it has a stated 
policy that in such circumstances it will require “burden sharing” by the holders of capital securities. 
  
SRB adopts a 
resolution 
scheme 
Commission 
endorses 
resolution 
scheme 
Council does 
not object to 
resolution 
scheme 
Scheme enters 
into force 
Commission prohibits or requires 
amendments to exclusion of some 
liabilities that requires contribution 
from SRF or other sources. 
Commission 
objects to 
resolution 
scheme  
SRB revises 
scheme 
 Commission proposes that the 
Council approves/objects to 
modification of amount of SRF 
provided for in resolution scheme 
Council objects 
to resolution 
scheme 
 
 Commission proposes that the 
Council objects to scheme because it 
does not fulfil the public-interest 
condition 
Council objects 
because public-
interest 
condition is not 
fulfilled 
Institution is 
wound up in 
orderly 
manner  
Assessment 
of 
conditions 
14 | THOMAS F. HUERTAS 
 
This is especially important in the eurozone. Under banking union there is an extremely 
complex procedure for approving the resolution scheme that the SRB proposes (see Figure 3).  
This procedure can potentially take up to 32 hours – leaving only six to twelve hours for the 
NRAs to actually implement the plan. That is unlikely to be enough time, especially if the 
distressed bank has significant operations outside the eurozone. Indeed, if the eurozone 
authorities were to take all the time allowed under the SRM Regulation to approve the 
resolution plan, this would raise the risk that one or more of the authorities outside the SRM 
would initiate action to ring-fence and/or resolve branches and/or subsidiaries of the failing 
eurozone bank prior to the SRM’s reaching a final decision. If one or more non-SRM authorities 
were to “jump the gun”, this could make it difficult, if not impossible, for the SRM to 
implement its preferred resolution strategy. In addition, the cooperation between the SSM, 
part of an independent central bank, and the SRM, an agency reporting to the European 
Commission, will need to work. This is particularly important in determining the quantity of 
fresh capital required, on a timely basis. Ideally, therefore, the decision to place the bank into 
resolution will be one well prepared in advance. As outlined above, cross-border coordination 
among home and host authorities in jointly developing a preferred path is the key to being 
able to implement resolution successfully. Any necessary approvals (or statements of no 
objection) should be obtained prior to putting the bank into resolution, so that the authorities 
can move immediately to implement resolution along the preferred path. This should also help 
prevent fragmented resolution actions in non-SRM jurisdictions. 
When should the decision be implemented? The exact time at which the bank enters resolution 
matters greatly. Entering at the end of the business day after payment systems and other 
financial market infrastructures have completed settlement greatly simplifies resolution. In 
contrast, entering resolution in the midst of the business day creates significant settlement 
(Herstatt) risk44 and reduces the likelihood that stabilisation will be successful. 
For internationally active banks the “end of the business day” is likely to mean the end of the 
business day in the United States and the completion of the settlement cycle on US financial 
market infrastructures. This raises the practical problem of how to offset the liquidity outflows 
that are likely to occur during the final hours before the distressed bank officially reaches the 
PONV and enters resolution. The problem is likely to be especially acute for non-US banks 
with branches and/or subsidiaries in the United States. 
The introduction of intra-day liquidity reporting is a first step toward solving this problem, 
for it allows supervisors and central banks to determine the scope and locus of the liquidity 
shortfall (BCBS, 2013). But solving the problem will require further steps, either to: 
 Define a universal “end of the business day” standard for internationally active banks 
and agree procedures necessary to make sure that the group gets to that point as a 
going concern. This is likely to be especially important for SPE resolution strategies. 
 Work out how part(s) or all of an internationally active banking group could fail during 
the business day. This is likely to be especially important for MPE resolution strategies. 
                                                   
44 The Herstatt risk, also known as cross-currency settlement risk or foreign-exchange risk is the risk 
that a party to a trade fails to make payment even though it has been paid by its counterparty. It is 
named after the German bank Herstatt whose license was withdrawn by German regulators on 26 June 
1974, due to its inability to cover its liabilities. This forced the bank into liquidation and it ceased 
operating. However, because of the time-zone differences, Herstatt was unable to pay some New York 
banks for the foreign exchange it had received, and hence caused them substantial losses. 
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What should be communicated at the time of the decision? Obviously, resolution authorities need 
to communicate to the market that they have put the bank into resolution. But the 
communication need not, indeed must not, stop there. It is vitally important that the 
communication also includes the following elements: 
 overall resolution strategy that the resolution authorities will implement, 
 specification of which entities and functions will continue in operation and 
 assessment of how resolution will impact the principal liabilities of the bank.45  
The actual resolution plan should conform as closely to the previously agreed preferred path 
as possible, given the changing circumstances of the resolution event (e.g. market conditions). 
That will confirm investors’ expectations, enhance market discipline and promote financial 
stability. When it comes to implementing resolution, certainty is constructive. Ambiguity 
should be reserved (and observed) for ELA. 
Table 2. Constructive ambiguity and constructive certainty: Is current policy the wrong way round? 
ELA Resolution Comment 
Certainty Ambiguity Certainty to grant ELA creates forbearance, increases 
loss given resolution (LGR). Ambiguity with  respect to 
resolution plan increases  variance of loss given 
resolution (LGR)  and raises risk level 
Ambiguity Certainty Ambiguity regarding ELA limits forbearance, reduces 
LGR. Certainty with respect to resolution (announcing 
and sticking to a ‘preferred path’) increases the 
certainty that investors will suffer loss and may reduce 
variance in LGR. 
2.2 Resolution plans should create a ‘pre-pack’ that can stabilise the bank-
in-resolution  
To stabilise the bank in resolution the resolution authority must be able to i) recapitalise the 
failed bank and ii) provide assurances that the recapitalised bank-in-resolution can reopen for 
business. This will enable the bank-in-resolution to continue to perform its critical economic 
functions.  
Recapitalising the bank-in-resolution. Effective resolution regimes envisage that investors, and 
not taxpayers, will recapitalise the bank-in-resolution. To ensure this will be the case, there 
must be: 
 a means by which the resolution authority can force investors to do so, immediately 
and unequivocally, upon the entry of the bank into resolution. Under the BRRD the 
bail-in tool provides the means to achieve this. 
 a sufficient amount of investor obligations upon which the resolution authority can 
immediately and unequivocally exercise the above means whilst limiting adverse 
effects. Under the BRRD, the MREL requirement assures this (if properly 
implemented, with changes to insolvency law as necessary): it effectively subdivides 
                                                   
45 This statement should cover (at a minimum) the treatment of common equity, additional tier 1 capital, 
tier 2 capital, other subordinated debt, senior debt, derivatives and deposits (both insured and 
uninsured as well as retail, SME and large corporate deposits). This communication should cover the 
bank’s holding company (if any) as well as the group’s principal bank and non-bank subsidiaries. 
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the creditor hierarchy subject to bail-in into two classes: an investor class (MREL) 
subject to immediate bail-in,46 and all other liabilities subject to bail-in (this includes 
customer or operating liabilities such as deposits). In concept, MREL is similar to 
TLAC (total loss-absorbing capacity) developed by the FSB (FSB, 2015a; Fortésa, 
Molinari, & Venus, 2015), and the EBA has indicated an intention to standardise the 
two definitions, at least as far as G-SIBs are concerned (EBA, 2015b). 
Bail-in. Under bail-in the resolution authority is empowered to write down and/or convert 
into common equity certain liabilities of the bank upon the entry of the bank into resolution. 
For this tool be employed effectively, both the resolution authority and funds providers to the 
bank should know in advance: i) which liabilities are eligible and ineligible for bail-in, ii) the 
order in which the resolution authority will bail-in eligible liabilities, iii) the terms on which 
the bail-in will occur and iv) whether the bail-in can be exercised for all eligible instruments 
issued by the bank, including those issued in foreign jurisdictions and/or under foreign law. 
The BRRD clearly distinguishes between liabilities eligible for bail-in and those exempt from 
bail in. The Directive also establishes the order in which the resolution authority should bail 
in the eligible liabilities (see Table 3). Bail-in will first be applied to capital instruments, starting 
with writing down the existing equity, then writing down and/or converting Additional Tier 
1 instruments such as preferred stock, and then proceeding to Tier 2 capital instruments such 
as qualifying subordinated debt.47 Under CRD IV (and Basel III), such instruments have to be 
subject to write-down or conversion at the PONV, if they are to continue to count towards 
capital requirements.  
So far, so simple. Capital instruments are plainly investor obligations, and they are clearly 
subordinated to operational liabilities such as deposits. At the opposite end of the bail-in 
ladder, things are simple as well. Secured obligations are exempt from bail-in.   
It is in the middle of the bail-in ladder that complications arise. These concern the position of 
the instrument in the creditor hierarchy as well as partial exemptions from bail-in for certain 
maturities and/or holders of the instrument. In “exceptional circumstances”, the resolution 
authority has the discretion to exclude some or all of an instrument from bail-in, either 
generally in advance or on a case-by-case basis during the resolution process itself.  In the 
absence of an EU standard defining what qualifies as “exceptional”, the door may be open for 
different jurisdictions to make different choices with respect to these options. This creates the 
prospect that bail-in will proceed differently in each member state – a fact that is likely to 
confuse investors and raise the cost of funding.  
Take the case of senior debt. This is plainly an investor obligation and is subject to bail-in under 
the BRRD. Senior debt will generally rank pari passu with other senior unsecured obligations, 
such as derivatives. If so, such debt will not qualify for TLAC in most circumstances and may 
face limits with respect to its use in meeting the MREL requirement. Hence, banks in such 
situations would need to rely more heavily on AT1 and T2 capital to meet TLAC and possibly 
MREL requirements. If such debt is subordinated to operating liabilities such as derivatives 
and deposits, it will count towards TLAC as well as MREL. Such subordination can be 
achieved statutorily, contractually or structurally (i.e. issued by a non-operating holding 
company).   
                                                   
46 Note that uncovered deposits with more than 1-year residual maturity may also qualify as MREL. 
47 Strictly speaking, common equity is not subject to bail-in as it already bears first loss and is the 
instrument into which bail-in may convert other liabilities.  
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Table 3. BRRD creates priorities under bail-in and MREL assures adequate investor capital to support 
recap 
Order of 
bail-in Obligation 
Eligible Comment 
MREL TLAC 
1 Common equity   
Absorbs first loss 
2 AT1   
Capital instrument subject to 
write-down or conversion at 
PONV (Basel III, CRD IV)  
3 T2   
Capital instrument subject to 
write-down or conversion at 
PONV (Basel III, CRD IV) 
4 Other sub debt   
Other sub debt with remaining 
maturity greater than 1 year 
counts towards MREL 
5 
ST senior debt   Does not count as MREL or TLAC 
LT senior debt 
  
Counts as MREL (if RA does not 
exclude from bail-in) 
Counts as TLAC if subordinated 
to operating liabilities  
Derivatives    
Net amount of derivatives is 
subject to bail-in but such net 
amount does not count towards 
MREL 
6 
Uninsured deposits   
>1 year remaining maturity: can 
be included in MREL, if they are 
deposits of large corporations;  
Counts as TLAC if insured 
deposits have preference over 
uninsured 
Insured deposits    
Insured deposits are not subject to 
bail-in, but loss in liquidation may 
count towards MREL 
Secured obligations   
Not subject to bail-in, not included 
in MREL, not included in TLAC 
 
Some member states (e.g. Germany) have taken the statutory route. In connection with 
implementing the BRRD they have effectively transformed senior debt into intermediate debt, 
i.e. a class that is senior to subordinated debt but junior to customer obligations, such as 
corporate deposits and derivatives (Bundes Finanz Ministerium, 2015).48 This facilitates using 
                                                   
48  The ECB has issued a mostly favourable opinion of the German proposal. It considers that the 
subordination of senior unsecured debt would “facilitate resolution action and the implementation of 
the FSB’s TLAC proposals” by virtue of 1) minimising “the risk of compensation claims under the ‘no 
creditor worse off’ principle”; 2) making “the bail-in of unsecured bank debt instruments… more 
effective and credible to market participants,” which should reduce “the need to have recourse to the 
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senior debt to meet MREL and TLAC requirements. Essentially, the German approach amends 
by statute the rights that creditors might be able to exercise in the future, if the bank were to 
become insolvent. Greece has made similar arrangements.  
In contrast, other member states (e.g. Italy) have implemented the BRRD in a manner such that 
senior debt remains pari passu with derivatives, corporate deposits and even liabilities 
excluded from bail-in (e.g. operating suppliers, excluded short interbank deposits). In such 
cases, bailing in the senior debt would place a disproportionately high burden of loss on senior 
debt holders, whilst other creditors in the same class (e.g. derivative counterparties) would be 
treated more favourably. This could give rise to a material risk of successful legal challenge or 
valid compensation claims due to the “no creditor worse off than in liquidation” safeguard (or 
NCWO), which broadly requires respect of the creditor hierarchy and equal treatment of 
similarly situated creditors.49 The larger the deviation from the creditor hierarchy, the greater 
the NCWO risk. As a result, such pari passu debt does not qualify for TLAC in most 
circumstances50 and might be subject to limits in meeting MREL requirements. 
More importantly, differences in national implementation of the BRRD mean there will not be 
a single creditor hierarchy for banks across the EU. Consideration should be given to 
converging towards one over time along the lines of the German law, so as to create a class of 
‘intermediate’ debt that meets the TLAC standard for subordination.51 At a minimum, there 
should be EU-wide standards for what makes a circumstance ‘exceptional’.  
Bail-in of derivatives. The BRRD subjects the obligation of the failing bank to non-defaulting 
counterparties under derivatives contracts to bail-in after giving consideration to netting and 
collateral agreements. In concrete terms, the resolution authority will estimate close-out 
amounts that may be due from the failing bank to non-defaulting counterparties, taking into 
account the replacement cost that the counterparty might incur. The resolution authority will 
then deduct any collateral that the failing bank had pledged to the non-defaulting 
counterparty to arrive at a final unsecured amount due to the non-defaulting counterparty. It 
is this amount that will be subject to bail-in (written down or converted to equity).52 
Note that the bail-in of derivatives may yield little or no increment to CET1 capital, once the 
effects of netting and collateral are taken into account. For this reason the resolution authority 
                                                   
resolution fund,” thereby “promoting adequate pricing of risk on the side of investors”; and 3) allowing 
banks to “use some of their already-issued debt instruments to meet the TLAC requirement”. While the 
ECB acknowledges that the subordination of senior unsecured debt could have adverse consequences 
(notably on “pricing and capital requirements for holding senior unsecured bank bonds” and on 
financing costs for banks), it nonetheless implicitly calls for the German proposal to serve as the basis 
for a common EU-wide framework. See (ECB, 2015). For other comments welcoming the German 
position, see (FitchRatings, 2015) (Euromoney, 2015).  
49 (Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze, 2015). The Italian law gives preference to corporate deposits 
but leaves senior debt pari passu with derivatives. For a discussion of the problems the Italian proposal 
could create, see (Bschor, 2015) and (ClearyGottlieb, 2015). 
50 G-SIBs in some member states may be permitted to count such debt towards TLAC up to 3.5% RWA 
in cases where the resolution authority may, under exceptional circumstances, excluded or partially 
exclude from bail-in all liabilities excluded from TLAC. See Section 11 of the TLAC Term Sheet. 
51 This need not take immediate effect (so as to leave rights of current creditors unaffected) but could be 
deferred to a later date (say [2022]), possibly with grandfathering privileges for any issues that are 
currently outstanding but maturing after [2022].  
52  Article 49, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN).  
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may choose to exempt the derivatives contracts from close-out and bail-in on the ground that 
“the application of the bail-in tool to those liabilities would cause destruction in value such 
that the losses borne by other creditors would be higher than if those liabilities were excluded 
from bail-in”.53  
Bail-in of deposits. It should be stressed that the power to bail in the bank’s liabilities extends 
all the way up the creditor hierarchy. In particular, deposits are eligible for bail-in.54 However, 
the whole purpose of TLAC and MREL – coupled with the preference given to deposits under 
the BRRD -- is to avoid getting to the point where deposits would be bailed in (for bailing in 
deposits is likely to interrupt critical economic functions and may adversely affect financial 
markets and the economy at large).55 
If it becomes necessary to bail in deposits, careful planning will be required to minimise the 
disruption that the bail-in of deposits would cause. In particular, arrangements will have to be 
made (and be made known to depositors) regarding the amount and availability of funds in 
their deposit account. Note that for insured deposits, the depositor should retain the full 
amount (the deposit guarantee scheme will assume any losses attributable to the insured 
deposits). The issue will be whether the depositor continues to have access to his funds so that 
he may continue to use their account to make and receive payments.  
The role of the DGS. The role of the DGS should be separate and distinct from that of the 
resolution fund. The former’s sole objective should be to protect insured deposits and such 
liability in the context of resolution should not exceed the losses under normal insolvency 
proceedings. 56  The introduction of retail and SME depositor preference together with the 
imposition of MREL materially reduces the risk of retail and SME deposits and the claims that 
could be made against the DGS, particularly if the authorities do not exercise forbearance and 
initiate resolution promptly at the point of non-viability (PONV). 57  The objective of the 
resolution fund is to facilitate resolution more generally and to indirectly absorb losses, 
provided investors have already borne losses equivalent to 8% of the bank’s liabilities (see 
above).  
Resolution authorities should implement write-down or conversion of investor obligations in accordance 
with market principles. Regarding the terms on which bail-in occurs, resolution statutes mandate 
that the resolution authority allocate losses in line with the independent valuation of the 
                                                   
53  Article 44, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN).  
54 Note that BRRD distinguishes the three categories of deposits: uncovered deposits of large corporates, 
uncovered deposits held by natural persons and SMEs (preferred), and deposits covered by Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme (super-preferred).  
55 The BRRD does not mandate protection for large corporate deposits. However, such deposits are a 
substantial part of the payments system – they may include payments due to employees’ salaries or due 
for goods and services to others, including SMEs, or amounts due and payable on other corporate 
liabilities. Bailing them in may therefore cause wider economic damage. 
56 However, the DGS Directive allows member states to use its funds for resolution, in the last instance 
to prevent a bank failure, and when certain conditions are met. Article 11, OJ 173 of 12.6.2014 
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0049&from=EN). 
57 The deposit guarantee schemes might be further integrated within the Eurozone. See Gros (2015) for 
a discussion of the European Commission’s November 2015 proposal for a European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme. 
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bank’s assets and liabilities, subject to a provision that no creditor should become worse off 
than it would have been under liquidation according to ordinary insolvency proceedings.58 
The challenge is to find a practical way to implement the legislation. A full valuation may not 
be either timely enough or exact enough to allocate loss at the resolution weekend. This creates 
the risk that forbearance will have to be exercised whilst the valuation is completed, that 
stabilisation may not succeed and/or that compensation would be due to creditors under the 
’no creditor worse off’ provision.  
Accordingly, the resolution authority may find it efficient to accept a provisional valuation.59 
This should be sufficient to decide the most critical issue at the point of non-viability: where 
bail-in should stop (i.e. which classes of liabilities should be bailed in). If bail-in extends to a 
portion of a class (as it does in our example), it should be exercised for the class as a whole – 
in all probability that will be a necessity to ensure there is no realistic possibility of a successful 
legal challenge to the bail-in action. That will assure equal treatment of creditors within the 
class as well as a degree of conservatism in the valuation. Most importantly, such a valuation 
will allow the resolution authorities to proceed with the bail-in and then move on to the other 
tasks required to assure successful stabilisation.  
There is general agreement that ‘strict seniority’ should be the principle on which liabilities 
should be written down and/or converted into common equity. However, there are two 
schools of thought as to what strict seniority means: 
 Strict seniority in the allocation of loss: no loss should be imposed on a class senior to 
a junior class, unless that junior class has been written off completely and 
extinguished. For example, no loss should be imposed on AT1 capital unless common 
equity has been written off and extinguished.  
 Strict seniority in the allocation of cash generated from the estate of the failed bank. 
This corresponds to the treatment of claims in ordinary insolvency/bankruptcy. 
Under this approach claims remain in force. At the point of entry into insolvency, 
creditors are given receivership certificates as evidence of their claim on the estate of 
the failed institution and a stay is placed on payments to holders of such certificates. 
As the insolvency practitioner winds down the entity in administration, cash may be 
generated and a dividend to creditors declared. Such dividends are distributed to 
holders of receivership certificates in order of strict seniority, i.e. certificates 
evidencing senior debt receive all cash generated by the estate until the claim of the 
senior debt holders (including accrued interest) is paid in full. Then, cash is paid to 
holders of certificates evidencing subordinated debt, etc. Any residual cash remaining 
after all liabilities and administrative expenses have been paid accrues to the holders 
of receivership certificates evidencing common stock. 
In our view, the second approach is preferable, especially if implemented via receivership 
certificates. In aggregate the outstanding certificates can absorb loss during the entire 
resolution process. Moreover, such receivership certificates are comparable to what debt-
                                                   
58  Article 47 and 48, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN).  
59  Article 36, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN).  
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holders in a normal corporate bankruptcy would receive and are consistent with the ‘true-up’ 
requirements called for when a provisional valuation is employed.60 
Enforceability. For bail-in to be effective, it must be legally enforceable. For domestic issuance 
under domestic law in the bank’s home country, this should be the case. Under the BRRD this 
will also be the case for instruments issued in another member state or under the laws of 
another member state. However, for instruments issued in third countries and/or under the 
law of a third country (e.g. dollar-denominated senior debt issued in the US under New York 
law), investors may seek and receive an injunction from a court in the third country to prevent 
the bank’s resolution authority from bailing in the liability in question. 
To assure that liabilities eligible for bail-in are in fact capable of being bailed in should the 
need arise, the BRRD requires banks, from the date of respective national implementation of 
the Directive, to insert into all new issues of senior debt/eligible liabilities such contractual 
terms that indicate that the instrument is subject to write-down or conversion, if the bank 
enters resolution.61 Over time this would assure that the resolution authority could enforce 
bail-in against all eligible liabilities. 
MREL/TLAC. For a bank to be resolvable, there has to be a reasonable assurance that the 
amount of reserve capital will be sufficient to replenish the bank’s CET1 capital to a level 
where the bank is not only solvent but able, given sufficient access to liquidity, to continue 
operation whilst restructuring under the aegis of the resolution authorities. Determining the 
level of reserve capital therefore requires one to take a view on: i) what constitutes the correct 
target for CET1 capital after replenishment/recap; and ii) what is the likely state of CET1 
capital at the point at which the authorities initiate resolution.62 Note that it is vital that this 
replenishment occurs at the bank level. Bail-in at a parent holding company will not in and of 
itself recapitalise the subsidiary bank or enable the subsidiary bank to continue to perform 
critical economic functions, unless the capital created at the parent level can be effectively 
down-streamed to the banking subsidiary (see Box 2). To facilitate the recapitalisation of the 
subsidiary bank(s), the TLAC standard includes a framework for external TLAC to be down-
streamed to a G-SIB’s material subsidiaries in the form of internal TLAC.63 This internal TLAC 
is pre-positioned on the balance sheet of the subsidiary bank. The host resolution authority of 
the subsidiary bank will trigger internal TLAC instruments at the PONV, in coordination with 
the home authority. Losses are up-streamed to the parent company. This approach means that 
the subsidiary bank can be recapitalised without having to enter into resolution itself. 
As to the target for CET1 after recap, a conservative standard is to assume that CET1 should 
be replenished so that the bank-in-resolution meets not only the Basel III minimum 
requirement (4.5% of risk-weighted assets), but also fills the capital conservation buffer (2.5% 
of RWAs) and possibly some or all of the surcharge on SIFIs currently 1-2.5% of RWAs. This 
would assure that the bank-in-resolution started the restructuring phase with CET1 capital at 
the threshold at which a bank outside resolution would be permitted to pay dividends or make 
                                                   
60  Article 36 (10 and 11), OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN). 
61  Article 55, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN).  
62 (Huertas 2015).  
63 See Sections 16 to 19 of the TLAC Term Sheet. 
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distributions without restrictions.64 More importantly, it will help ensure that the bank is 
sufficiently well capitalised to command market confidence. This will be necessary to ensure 
that counterparties continue to trade with the resolved bank and provide funding to it. 
                                                   
64 According to the Bank of England (2014, p. 21), “The goal of ensuring that the firm can operate 
unsupported means that the firm must be recapitalised to a level that is sufficient to restore market 
confidence and allow the firm to access private funding markets. This means that the level of capital 
held by the firm is likely to need to be higher than the minimum required for authorisation by the 
relevant supervisor.” The European Banking Authority (2014a takes a similar approach as does the 
Federal Reserve Board (2015). 
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Box 2. Where should bail-in occur? 
To be effective, bail-in has to occur at the operating bank level. It is the conversion of the 
obligations that the bank has issued to investors (one of which may be the bank’s parent holding 
company) that serves to recapitalise the bank. The write-down or conversion of the parent 
holding company’s debt held by third-party investors does not in and of itself recapitalise the 
subsidiary bank. 
Table 4. Bail-in at parent does not recapitalise the subsidiary bank  
a.) Parent holding company only              IC initial condition                  BB bail-in at banks 
                                                                   LB loss (100) in bank sub.       BP bail-in at parent 
Assets IC LB BP BB Liabilities IC LB BP BB 
CET1 in bank 
sub 100 0 0 100 CET1 100 0 100 100 
Sub debt (T2) 
in sub 100 100 100 0 AT2 0 0 0 0 
     T2 100 100 0 0 
Marketable 
securities 50 50 50 50 Senior debt 50 50 50 50 
Total 250 150 150 150 Total 250 150 150 150 
b.) Bank subsidiarity 
Assets IC LB BP BB Liabilities IC LB BP BB 
Loans 1000 900 900 900 CET1 100 0 0 100 
Investments 1000 1000 1000 1000 Sub debt (T2) (AT1-0) 100 100 100 0 
     
Other 
costumer 
obligations 
300 300 300 300 
     Deposits 1500 1500 1500 1500 
Total 2000 1900 1900 1900 Total 2000 1900 1900 1900 
 
Bail-in at the parent does of itself not affect the balance sheet of the subsidiary bank. The 
recapitalisation of the parent has no direct impact whatsoever on the level of CET1 capital in the 
bank subsidiary. This is illustrated in Table 4. Initially (see column IC), the parent has assets of 
250 consisting of investments in the CET1 capital of its bank subsidiary (100), the T2 capital of 
the bank subsidiary (100) and marketable securities (50). The bank subsidiary then suffers a loss 
of 100 in its loan portfolio (see column LB). This reduces the bank subsidiary’s CET1 capital to 
zero. At the parent level, its investment in the bank’s CET1 capital is written down to zero, and 
this causes an equivalent reduction in the parent’s own equity. This too falls to zero. 
The parent now bails in the subordinated debt that it has issued to third-party investors (see 
column BP). Tier 2 debt falls from 100 to zero, and CET1 capital at the parent increases from zero 
to 100. That is all the bail in at the parent does. It does not create capital at the subsidiary level.  
To recapitalise the bank subsidiary, it is necessary either to bail-in (via write-down or 
conversion) obligations that the bank subsidiary had previously issued to the parent, or for the 
parent to inject new equity into the bank subsidiary. The bail-in at the bank subsidiary is 
illustrated in column BB. The bank’s T2 capital is converted into CET1 capital. The former falls 
from 100 to zero, whilst the latter rises from zero to 100. These changes are also reflected on the 
asset side of the parent only balance sheet. The critical issue, here, is that appropriate obligations 
are due from the subsidiary to the parent which can be written-down or converted under the 
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powers of the BRRD, or even as a consensual inter-company debt for equity swap. The nature of 
the inter-company obligation could be capital (AT1 or T2) or internal TLAC or MREL. 
Alternatively, if the parent holding company’s cash and marketable securities are to be the 
source of funds for the recapitalisation of the subsidiary bank, the parent will have had to take 
steps to assure that i) the cash would in fact be available, when the bank subsidiary reached the 
PONV/entered resolution, and ii) the cash would indeed be used to recapitalise the failed bank 
subsidiary. 
 
The likely state of the bank’s CET1 capital upon entry into resolution depends largely on 
whether the authorities initiate resolution (‘pull the trigger’) promptly at the PONV or exercise 
forbearance. If they do the former, there is a greater probability that the bank still has positive 
net worth and positive CET1 capital. In this case, a reserve capital requirement equal to the 
target described above is likely to be sufficient. In contrast, if the supervisor and/or central 
bank exercise forbearance, such a reserve capital requirement may be insufficient.   
The BRRD meets the criteria outlined above. It requires each bank to maintain the amount of 
own funds and eligible liabilities at a minimum required level (MREL). As mentioned above, 
MREL is similar to, but not identical with, the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) 
requirement being developed by the FSB for G-SIBs (see Table 2 above).65 
The MREL requirement is bank-specific and takes into account any exclusion from bail-in that 
the resolution authority may have made. The BRRD empowers the bank’s resolution authority 
to set the level of MREL for the bank, so that 
the institution has sufficient eligible liabilities to ensure that, if the bail-in tool were to 
be applied, losses could be absorbed and the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of the 
institution could be restored to a level necessary to enable it to continue to comply with 
the conditions for authorisation and to continue to carry out the activities for which it 
is authorised under Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive 2014/65/EU and to sustain 
sufficient market confidence in the institution or entity. (EBA, 2014a). 
In determining MREL the resolution authority should also take into account the individual 
bank’s size, model (business and funding) and risk profile, as well as the extent to which DGS 
contributes to financing the resolution and the potential threat of bank’s failure on the stability 
of financial system.66  Taken together, these conditions are intended to assure that MREL 
provides  
sufficient loss absorbing capacity … [to] … enable an orderly resolution, ensuring 
continuity of critical functions without recourse to public funds (EBA, 2014a). 
Finally, it should be noted that the resolution authority has the option to impose the TLAC 
requirement as the means by which the bank should fulfil some or all of the bank’s MREL 
                                                   
65 Note that a reserve capital requirement targets much more exactly the problem at hand, namely 
assurance that there will be instruments available to convert into CET1 capital, in the event that the 
bank goes into resolution, but has the disadvantage of discouraging banks from holding equity in excess 
of minimum requirements (and so making failure more likely in the first place). The FSB TLAC proposal 
(FSB, 2014) envisages that such “reserve capital” instruments would constitute at least one-third of 
TLAC, as does the Federal Reserve Board’s NPR (2015) with respect to TLAC for bank holding 
companies. 
66  Article 44.6, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN).  
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requirement. Resolution authorities within the EU should implement this option, at least for 
G-SIBs. 
Assuring the bank-in-resolution can reopen for business 
Although recapitalisation of the bank-in-resolution is necessary to stabilise the bank-in-
resolution, it is not sufficient. To assure continuity of critical economic functions it is also 
necessary to assure that the bank-in-resolution: 
i. retains the authorisation(s) and licence(s) that it requires; 
ii.  retains access to financial market infrastructures; 
iii. retains access to support services from affiliates and third parties; 
iv. does not incur termination of qualified financial contracts (QFCs), such as 
derivatives (the bank needs to remain hedged) and repurchase agreements (repos 
– the bank needs to maintain access to secured financing lines);  
v. has access to adequate liquidity; and 
vi. corporate deposits are protected, to the extent necessary to avoid consequential 
economic disruption to the payment systems, third-party suppliers, corporate 
employee salaries, etc. 
For banks that are internationally active, these preconditions must be met, not only in the 
bank’s home jurisdiction, but in all the jurisdictions in which the bank has material branches 
and/or subsidiaries. To achieve this, a certain degree of international cooperation among 
resolution authorities, central banks and supervisors will be required. 
Authorities should take steps to assure bank-in-resolution can retain authorisation(s) and license(s). 
For the bank-in-resolution to continue in operation, it is necessary for the bank to retain its 
authorisation(s) and license(s). In other words, the entry of the bank into resolution should not 
result in the revocation of the bank’s license and a requirement for the bank-in-resolution to 
reapply for a license. Instead, a process should be in place to treat the entry into resolution as 
a change-in-control process, with control passing from the owner of the bank to the resolution 
authority and pre-approval of the resolution authority as ‘fit and proper’ to run the bank in 
resolution.  
This will generally be the case for domestic banks or institutions headquartered in the banking 
group’s home country, but may give rise to issues for internationally active groups. It is 
particularly important that host-country authorities not take the decision of the home country 
to place the bank into resolution as the occasion or justification to: 
 place the bank-in-resolution’s branch in the host-country into a separate and distinct 
resolution proceeding,67 or 
 place the bank-in-resolution’s subsidiary in the host country that meets the host-
country’s threshold requirements into resolution. 
Authorities and FMIs should assure that the bank-in-resolution continues to have access to FMIs, such 
as payment systems, securities settlement systems and central counterparties. If the bank-in-
resolution is to function normally upon reopening for business after resolution, it will certainly 
need access to FMIs. Otherwise, it will not be able to make or receive payments, settle securities 
transactions or conduct derivative transactions. 
                                                   
67 For a discussion of this possibility see (Lee, 2014). 
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Figure 4. Continuity requires more than recap: Bank needs to retain access to financial market 
infrastructures 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
Source: Author. 
To assure that continuity is in fact preserved, the resolution regimes for banks should be 
coordinated with those for the FMIs (see Figure 4). In particular, the FMI should not be allowed 
to exclude a bank from the FMI solely on the basis that the bank or one of its affiliate entities 
has gone into resolution. Provided the bank-in-resolution has continued to make payments as 
due to the FMI (i.e. there has been no default on a cash obligation by the bank), the FMI should 
delay excluding the bank-in-resolution from the FMI as well as delay initiating loss allocation 
mechanisms within the FMI (the ‘waterfall’) for a period to allow the resolution authority to 
indicate that it has a) recapitalised the bank and b) assured adequate liquidity for the bank. 
With such assurance, the FMI can keep in force the membership of the bank in the FMI. That 
will not only facilitate the resolution of the failed bank, but help assure that the FMI remains 
robust. 
Resolution plans should ensure that the bank-in-resolution retains access to services from affiliates and 
third parties. To function effectively, the bank-in-resolution will require operational services 
such as IT infrastructure and transaction processing. Where these are provided externally by 
third parties, contracts should ensure that the entry of the bank into resolution will not cause 
an immediate disruption of service.  
Where the services are provided internally, steps need to be taken to assure that such services 
will continue to be provided to the bank-in-resolution. This should be the case where the 
services are provided within the bank that goes into resolution. The recapitalisation of the 
bank creates the basis for operational continuity that focuses on provision of the critical 
services, and hence enables continuity of the bank as a whole. However, if a bank receives 
services from another affiliate within the group, the supervisor and resolution authority of 
that bank will want to assure itself that such services will continue to be provided, even if the 
service recipient or the service provider enters resolution. 
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One possible method is to create a separately incorporated service company that will house 
the service capabilities for the group and contract with third parties as necessary for provision 
of services to the group. This service company would be capitalised and financed so that it had 
sufficient working capital to pay all of its expenses for a certain period, and contracts with 
service recipients within the group would be drawn so as to assure that the service company 
continued to provide service, even if the recipient entity were to enter resolution. 
Resolution plans should assure that qualified financial contracts do not terminate upon entry of the 
bank or any bank affiliate into resolution. Certain obligations, known as qualified financial 
contracts (QFCs), may pose a barrier to resolution. 68  Upon an event of default, the claim 
becomes immediately due and payable (it is exempt from the stay on payments to creditors). 
If the claim is not repaid, the holder of such obligations has the right to liquidate any collateral 
that the bank may have pledged to it and to keep the proceeds of such sale in satisfaction of 
the obligation. If the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to repay the obligation, the holder has 
an unsecured claim on the bank in default for the difference. If the proceeds of the sale are 
greater than the amount of the obligation, the holder returns the excess to the bank in default. 
The two principal types of qualified financial contracts are repurchase agreements69  and 
derivative contracts. Together these instruments account for a significant share of a bank’s 
balance sheet, particularly for banks with heavy involvement in trading activities. The obstacle 
to resolution stems from the fact that the lender or non-defaulting derivatives counterparty 
has the right to sell the collateral pledged to it upon an event of default. When selling the 
collateral, the lender/derivatives counterparty is primarily interested in getting a price 
sufficient to repay the loan with interest. Beyond that point any proceeds belong to the 
borrower. As a result, the lender may be inclined to accept offers for the collateral that 
effectively give up much if not all of the haircut that the lender had originally imposed.  
The loss of the haircut has two effects – first, it increases the loss that the bank-in-resolution 
has to incur and increases the probability that bail-in will have to extend beyond investor 
obligations to unsecured customer obligations such as deposits. That would compromise 
continuity. Second, the sale of the securities pledged under repurchase agreements is a source 
of contagion from the bank-in-resolution to financial markets and potentially to the economy 
as a whole. If the sale results in the loss of the haircut, it may imply a decline in the market 
price and a fall in income and capital at all the institutions in the market that hold such 
securities in their trading (mark-to-market) book. This effect is amplified, if the securities sold 
serve as a reference in the valuation of Level 2 or Level 3 assets. Hence, the sale of securities 
pledged by the bank-in-resolution can pose significant problems for the market as a whole.  
Similar problems arise in connection with derivatives contracts. Under netting agreements, the 
counterparty to the bank-in-resolution can terminate the derivatives contracts that it has with 
the bank-in-resolution. Upon termination the non-defaulting counterparty (NDC) calculates a 
close-out amount that the bank-in-resolution would owe under the netting contract. In making 
                                                   
68 For a discussion of the impact of QFCs on resolution, see Roe (2011). 
69 Under a repurchase agreement, the lender buys securities from the borrower, who enters into a 
commitment to repurchase at the maturity of the agreement the securities at a fixed (and somewhat 
higher) price than the lender originally paid to the borrower. This difference in price is the economic 
equivalent of interest on a loan. The securities transferred to the lender by the borrower are the economic 
equivalent of collateral. The price paid by the lender for the securities is at a discount or ‘haircut’ to 
market value. This haircut serves to protect the lender against loss in the event that the borrower fails 
to repurchase the securities at the agreed price upon maturity. In effect, the haircut protects the lender 
against a possible fall in the price of the securities purchased from the borrower. 
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this calculation, the NDC is allowed to use its replacement cost. In other words, the NDC 
makes the calculation not at the mid-market rate that the bank-in-resolution had used to value 
its contracts but at the end of the bid-offer spread that favours the NDC. This increases the 
amount due to the NDC, and this large(r) amount becomes immediately due and payable upon 
an event of default by the bank-in-resolution. 
Under margining agreements, the bank-in-resolution may have pledged collateral to the NDC 
as security that it would in fact be able to pay the amount due the NDC, if close-out were 
invoked. Under the terms of the derivative contract, the NDC has the same rights as the lender 
under a repurchase agreement to sell the collateral in satisfaction of its claims and to keep the 
proceeds. Accordingly, the same issues arise in connection with collateral pledged in 
connection with derivative contracts as those related to repurchase agreements (see above). 
To avoid these problems, resolution regimes envisage placing a stay on the ability of lenders 
under repurchase agreements and counterparties to derivative contracts to exercise their rights 
of termination. The purpose of the stay is to allow the resolution authority to arrange for the 
bank-in-resolution to be in the position to meet its obligations under the contracts. Either the 
bank-in-resolution is recapitalised via bail-in, or the resolution authority transfers the 
contracts to a bridge bank that will continue in operation. 
This is at best a partial solution. The stay may not be enforceable in foreign jurisdictions or for 
transactions concluded under foreign law. Relying solely on a stay also leaves open the 
possibility that the lenders and/or counterparties would elect to terminate as soon as the stay 
expires. What is needed is a mechanism that assures that they will not. Nor does the stay alone 
cure the complications that arise, if a bank’s parent holding company has guaranteed the 
performance of the bank subsidiary under such contracts. In such cases, the entry of the parent 
holding company into resolution or bankruptcy can trigger termination of repurchase 
agreements and/or derivative contracts under the cross-default provisions usually found in 
such contracts. This gives rise to the adverse effects described above and may obviate the so-
called single point of entry approach to resolution (see below). 
Perhaps the simplest way to overcome the barriers to resolution posed by qualified financial 
contracts is to exclude the entry into resolution as an event of default and to limit the right to 
terminate to the actual failure by the bank-in-resolution to meet a cash obligation due in full 
and on time. In any event, steps should be taken to eliminate the ability to terminate contracts 
at the bank level, unless there is a default at the bank level. The entry of a parent holding 
company into resolution or bankruptcy should not trigger cross-default provisions in qualified 
financial contracts at the bank level. 
Resolution plans should assure that the bank-in-resolution has adequate liquidity. Continuity of 
critical operations can only be assured, if the bank-in-resolution has access to adequate 
liquidity. 
The liquidity demands on the bank-in-resolution could be very large indeed. As soon as the 
bank-in-resolution opens for business, there is the very strong likelihood that any funds 
provider entitled to withdraw its money will do so. Additionally, inflows of cash into the bank-
in-resolution are likely to decline dramatically. Where possible, clients of the bank-in-
resolution will have changed their settlement instructions to stop their counterparties from 
paying in money to their accounts at the bank-in-resolution. 
Consequently, for stabilisation to succeed, the bank-in-resolution must have lined up adequate 
sources of liquidity prior to re-opening for business. Collateral is key. Once the bank has 
entered resolution, any provider of liquidity is likely to insist that this is done on a fully 
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collateralised, super-senior basis in a manner analogous to the provision of debtor-in-
possession financing in US Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. 
The framework for such a liquidity facility needs to be put in place well in advance of the bank 
being put into resolution.  The framework should cover four factors:  
(i) The priority of the liquidity facility relative to other liabilities on the bank in resolution. As 
a practical matter, liquidity facilities to the bank in resolution will need to be on a 
super-senior basis so that they would have priority in liquidation over all 
unsecured creditors.  
(ii) The pool of collateral backing the facility. As a practical matter this should be a charge 
over the unencumbered assets of the bank in resolution, including without 
limitation the investments of the parent bank in its subsidiaries. Any proceeds from 
asset sales should go towards repaying the facility. 
(iii) The allocation of loss, should the bank in resolution fail to repay the facility and the 
liquidation of the collateral prove insufficient to repay the facility.  
(iv) How and where the bank in resolution might draw on such a liquidity facility. Whilst 
private sources of funding are preferable and should be maximised to the extent 
possible, such sources are unlikely to be able to fully meet the liquidity and funding 
requirements of a large bank, particularly a G-SIB. For such firms, an effective 
public-sector backstop mechanism is necessary in order to promote market 
confidence in the bank-in-resolution and to encourage private sector counterparties 
to provide (or continue to provide) funding to the bank-in-resolution. Of course, 
the availability of a public-sector funding mechanism may pose moral hazard risk, 
and authorities will have to ensure that such funding is provided in a way that 
minimises this risk. 
To facilitate the possible arrangement of liquidity to a bank-in-resolution, it would make sense 
for the authorities to require banks whilst healthy to: 
 Assure that they can seamlessly transfer collateral pledged to one lender (e.g. a repo provider) 
to another. Much of the demand for liquidity at the bank’s re-opening for business will 
come from lenders who are secured, but who would prefer to avoid the possible 
complications that could arise if the resolution process were to become disorderly. 
Repayment of such lenders should bring about the immediate return of the collateral 
pledged to such lenders. 
This should be done on the basis of repayment versus release, so that the bank in 
resolution regains control over the collateral pledged to the lender being repaid at the 
same time that the repayment occurs. This will facilitate the ability of the bank-in-
resolution to pledge the returned collateral to the new liquidity provider. 
 Keep track of their unencumbered assets and assure that they can be pledged as collateral. To 
the extent that the bank-in-resolution has unencumbered assets, these can potentially 
serve as collateral for the liquidity provider, if the bank-in-resolution can provide 
documentation as to their amount. This will only be possible, if the bank-in-resolution 
can retrieve such information from systems established well before the supervisor 
pulled the trigger to resolution, such as those that might be used to support the 
development of a so-called collateral budget.70 The provider of funding may have to 
                                                   
70 A collateral budget would “track – in current market value terms - the amount of unencumbered 
assets available to the bank, and estimate the amount, timing and location of the cash the bank could 
realise, if it were to sell the asset or use the asset as collateral to raise funds from private lenders and/or 
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be willing and able to accept a broad range of unencumbered assets, given that the 
bank-in-resolution may have relatively few high-quality liquid assets available to 
secure funding. 
 Put in place pledge agreements that could be activated, if the bank were to enter resolution. 
This will assure that the potential liquidity provider can rapidly obtain control over 
the collateral that the bank-in-resolution has available to pledge. 
 Conduct periodic ‘fire drills’ to test operational procedures required for a rapid pledge of 
collateral to a liquidity provider. If a bank does enter into resolution, liquidity provision 
to the bank-in-resolution must function without a hitch. To assure that it does, if 
required to do so, it makes sense to rehearse the concrete steps that the bank-in-
resolution would have to take to pledge assets to a liquidity provider. The bank may 
also wish to consider (and the supervisor may require) the bank to pre-position 
collateral with the central bank, especially during the recovery phase (possible run up 
to resolution). 
The above steps are the minimum that can and should be done whilst the bank is healthy so 
that liquidity provision can proceed smoothly, if the bank does enter resolution. However, 
more could be done in advance, both to assure that the bank had unencumbered assets to serve 
as collateral as well as to set the terms and conditions on which a liquidity provider might 
extend credit to a bank-in-resolution.71 
Finally, a word on documentation. As noted above, the first step is to assure that the liquidity 
provider can take a pledge over collateral assigned by the bank-in-resolution to the liquidity 
provider. As a practical matter, this has to be established well before the bank enters 
resolution. Ideally, the authorities should also indicate the terms of a draft framework 
agreement under which liquidity could be provided to the bank in resolution, if a decision 
were made to provide the facility. This would include covenants on the bank-in-resolution, 
such as: i) a requirement that any proceeds from the sale of assets should go towards paying 
down the facility; ii) a prohibition on paying any dividends or making any distributions to the 
holders of proceeds notes (see above) until such time as the liquidity facility has been fully 
repaid with interest; and iii) a prohibition on the bank’s pledging unencumbered assets as 
collateral to third parties without a corresponding reduction in the outstanding liquidity 
facility or a waiver from the provider of the liquidity facility. 
                                                   
central bank under one or more of its normal lending facilities. Such a collateral budget should take into 
account the potential additional demands that counterparties will place on the bank to post collateral 
as the condition of the bank deteriorates as well as the possibility that lenders of collateral to the bank 
will run on the bank, just as lenders of cash (e.g. uninsured depositors) are withdrawing their funds. In 
particular, the bank should evaluate the probability that clients would curtail or cancel the ability of the 
bank to re-hypothecate to its lenders the securities that the client has pledged to the bank.”(Huertas, 
2014b, p. 31). 
71 On asset encumbrance, see (CGFS, 2013). From the standpoint of the bank-in-resolution, the greater 
the amount of unencumbered assets the bank has, the greater the potential funding the bank can obtain. 
One place to start is to assure that the bank restricts pledges of collateral to the trust for its covered 
bonds and securitisation issues to the minimum required under the indentures to such instruments. But 
that may not be enough to assure that the bank has unencumbered assets to offer as security to a 
liquidity provider to the bank-in-resolution. Consequently, it may make sense to put limits on the 
encumbrance that a bank may incur whilst healthy so that it has some collateral in reserve, should it 
enter recovery or resolution.  
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Note that such a draft framework agreement need not imply that the authorities themselves 
would provide liquidity to the bank-in-resolution. In particular, the central bank need not 
provide credit to any institution that it considers unviable, and the central bank should make 
clear that meeting the conditions set out in the framework agreement are a necessary but not 
necessarily sufficient condition for the central bank to provide credit to the bank-in-resolution. 
However, setting out the terms of a framework agreement in advance is a step towards what 
might be called “constructive certainty”. This has two advantages. First, it puts holders of the 
bank’s investor obligations on notice that if the bank-in-resolution does obtain a liquidity 
facility, it will be on a collateralised basis and that the bank-in-resolution will have to fully 
repay the facility before it can make distributions or pay dividends to the holders of proceeds 
notes. That in turn should induce investors to demand information from the bank regarding 
the amount of its unencumbered assets as well as limit the pledge of such assets to the pools 
backing the bank’s covered bonds and/or securitisation issues. 
Second, setting out the terms of the framework agreement may make it possible for private-
sector lenders to participate in the liquidity facility to the bank-in-resolution, for it outlines 
what the authorities are likely to permit the bank-in-resolution to do as well as the additional 
covenants that the lender would enjoy. 
2.3 Resolution plans should create a safe exit  
Stabilising the bank-in-resolution is the first and most important step towards assuring that 
the failure of the bank will not significantly disrupt financial markets or the economy at large. 
But stabilisation is not the end of the story. The goal of the resolution authority in the 
restructuring phase is to work itself out of a job: either to sell the bank to a third party, to return 
the bank to the private sector or to wind the bank down. To do so, the resolution authority will 
need the appropriate powers and be able to draw upon previously completed analyses and 
plans. Clarifying the rights of creditors during the restructuring process can also accelerate the 
restructuring as well as facilitate the sale of “reserve capital” instruments to investors. 
Resolution regimes should assure that the resolution authority has adequate powers. During the 
restructuring phase, the resolution authority must determine the future course of the bank-in-
resolution. It is therefore vital that the resolution authority have the same type of powers as 
an administrator or insolvency practitioner has in normal bankruptcy proceedings, including 
the ability to sell lines of business, individual subsidiaries or the bank as a whole.  
The BRRD provides for this. It authorises the resolution authority to take control of the bank 
under resolution. The resolution authority can take all business decisions, including without 
limitation removing or replacing senior management, or transferring the bank (or all or any of 
the bank’s rights, assets and liabilities) to a purchaser. To exercise such powers, the resolution 
authority need not obtain any additional approval or consent, or file notification prior to taking 
the actions.  
The resolution authority should be prepared to act quickly. Even if the stabilisation has been 
successful, the resulting bank may be brittle. Although the amount of MREL will be calculated 
so as to provide an ample cushion of capital for the bank-in-resolution (see above), customers 
may nonetheless shift their business away from the bank-in-resolution, and the bank’s key 
employees may depart. If this were to occur, the franchise value of the bank-in-resolution 
could quickly erode. 
For this reason, the resolution authority may need to move quickly to sell assets, lines of 
business or even the firm as a whole to third parties who have the capital strength and funding 
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necessary to sustain the business on an ongoing basis. Indeed, as part of its resolution 
planning, the resolution authority should form an idea of the assets that it could sell and to 
whom, with the most logical candidates for rapid sale perhaps being transactions involving 
the assets and/or businesses that the bank may have identified in the recovery phase but failed 
to complete. 
For those businesses that the bank-in-resolution cannot immediately sell, the resolution 
authority will have to decide whether to keep the business going (in the hope that it can be 
sold later) or to wind the business up.72 The most pressing problem is likely to be liquidity – 
how can the bank-in-resolution fund the assets that remain on its books? Without funding, 
liquidation is practically the only choice open to the resolution authority. With funding, the 
resolution authority has the opportunity to conduct restructuring in a more orderly, but 
nonetheless rapid manner. 
Clarifying the rights of creditors can accelerate restructuring and help assure that creditors are in 
fact no worse off than they would have been under liquidation. In economic terms, the bailed-
in creditors are collectively the owners of the bank-in-resolution. They have a claim (in order 
of seniority) on the cash flows that the bank-in-resolution may generate, once any official 
liquidity facility is repaid. But the bailed-in creditors do not have primary decision rights over 
the restructuring process. This rests with the resolution authority, and the resolution authority 
need not seek approval of its resolution plan from the bank or its creditors.  
In general, resolution regimes provide that creditors should be no worse off than they would 
have been under liquidation. To the extent that a creditor is worse off, it has a claim for 
compensation. To limit the possible amount of such claims and to induce creditors to play an 
active and constructive role in the restructuring process, it may therefore make sense to accord 
creditors some of the same rights that they would ordinarily enjoy in a bankruptcy proceeding 
for a non-financial corporation, particularly in the case where investors have obtained 
receivership certificates during the stabilisation phase.73 
Since such rights would accrue to creditors as a class, banking organisations as well as 
resolution authorities may find it advantageous to put in place a mechanism to allow creditors 
to function as a class. Ideally, such a mechanism would be put in place whilst the bank is 
healthy so that it could function immediately upon the entry of the bank into resolution.74 
                                                   
72 Such a wind-down can be on a solvent or insolvent basis.  
73 See Annex 2 for a specification of the kind of right that it might include. 
74 Such a mechanism might include: 
 a registry of the owners of the instruments in the class; 
 a process to allow for transfers of ownership of the instruments in the class. Voting rights for 
matters affecting the class should be linked to the ownership of the instrument. 
 a process to notify such owners of material information pertaining to the class, including any 
voting materials; 
 an accelerated voting process; 
 cram-down provisions. Approval by a supermajority (e.g. 75%) of the votes in a class shall bind 
the class – court-sanctioned schemes of arrangement under English law which bind a class of 
creditors (and so go beyond obligation–by-obligation consent solicitations) have much to 
recommend in this regard. One was successfully used to recapitalise the Co-operative Bank. 
 a standing creditors’ committee to represent the interests of the class vis-à-vis other classes and 
the resolution authority. Prior to the entry of the bank into resolution, the main functions of this 
standing creditors’ committee would be to monitor the covenants that the instrument might 
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From a public policy point of view such a mechanism would enhance market discipline. In 
particular, it would reinforce to creditors that they were at risk if the bank entered resolution. 
They would be bailed in, not bailed out. From a creditor point of view, such a mechanism 
(particularly the standing creditors’ committee) would facilitate monitoring (and so reduce the 
risk that the bank would enter resolution) as well as help reduce loss-given resolution. 
3. Preparation is essential, if resolution is to succeed in practice 
As the above discussion demonstrates, resolution may be feasible in concept, but has certain 
challenges to overcome, before one can be certain that resolution will succeed in practice. With 
respect to the bail-in tool, these challenges principally relate to the stabilisation phase. 
Triggering resolution in turn triggers the need to bail in the appropriate amount of eligible 
liabilities, avoid termination of qualified financial contracts, retain access to financial market 
infrastructures, and assure adequate liquidity, etc. all within 36 to 48 hours and all in 
coordination with authorities around the world.  
Meeting these challenges will be easier, if steps have been taken during what might be called 
the runway period – by the authorities and by the bank itself -- to prepare for the bank’s 
resolution. For the authorities, such steps would include: 
 finalising the resolution plan and securing in advance all necessary approvals;  
 commissioning an independent valuer to undertake the valuations required to make a 
determination that the bank should enter resolution and to evaluate the use of the bail-
in tool; and 
 developing the communications plan to the public at large as well as to all relevant 
stakeholders. 
For the bank, such steps would include: 
 running the bank in accordance with its recovery plan; 
 preparing all data that the resolution authority would require in order to effect 
stabilisation of the bank, including without limitation: 
o the schedule of the bank’s liabilities ranked according to the creditor hierarchy; 
o the netting agreements with the bank’s principal counterparties (including any 
stay provisions) as well as an estimate of the value of the bank’s net position if 
the counterparty were to close out against the bank; 
o the amount of collateral pledged to lenders to back the bank’s secured 
funding;75 
o the amount and type of the bank’s unencumbered assets as well as their 
eligibility for discount under normal central bank lending facilities;  
o a schedule of MREL instruments containing terms and conditions on which 
such instruments could be written down or converted into common equity;  
o such information as the independent valuer requires to make the valuations 
required under the BRRD; and 
                                                   
contain and to exercise any rights that the creditors might have under such covenants as well 
as to negotiate possible debt for equity swaps. 
75 The bank should also take steps to remove ‘excess’ collateral from the pool pledged to the lender (i.e. 
collateral over and above the minimum amount necessary to secure the facility. 
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o up-to-date playbooks concerning how the bank would interact with service 
providers, financial market infrastructures and liquidity providers, if the bank 
were to enter resolution. 
Should the distressed bank refuse or prove unable to perform these tasks on its own initiative, 
the supervisor should employ its early intervention powers to force the bank to do so.76  
4. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
The BRRD puts in place a legislative framework that is consistent with the FSB’s key attributes 
for effective resolution regimes. The BRRD therefore creates the potential to make banks 
resolvable and bring an end to the too-big-to-fail phenomenon. To realise this potential, EU 
member states have established institutions at national, eurozone and EU level to create and, 
if necessary, execute resolution plans for EU banks and banking groups.  
This is a strong foundation. But it will not be enough to build an effective resolution regime. 
The authorities -- in the EU and in the third countries in which EU banks do business -- must 
be willing to put promptly into resolution any bank that reaches the point of non-viability, 
able to use the appropriate tools to stabilise the bank-in-resolution and ready to restructure 
the bank, once stabilised, so that it can exit resolution safely. 
Planning and coordination hold the key to success. Resolution is a complex process, and the 
stabilisation phase has to be accomplished at great speed, if the continuity of critical economic 
functions is to be assured. Planning can establish what is likely to work and what won’t. 
Planning can also identify (and possibly remove) the obstacles that stand in the way of turning 
“won’t” to “will”, so that one can be confident that, should it become necessary to pull the 
trigger, resolution will in fact make banks safe to fail. 
It is in this spirit that this report has offered a number of policy recommendations. The four 
principal recommendations are: 
1. Create constructive certainty. Each significant bank’s crisis management group should 
develop and make known the ‘preferred path’ they intend to employ, if it becomes 
necessary to place the bank into resolution. This should not only evidence cooperation and 
coordination among authorities across borders but also reinforce with investors that they 
are at risk, if the bank fails. 
2. Respect the market. For bail-in to work, the investor obligations most likely to be subject to 
bail-in (AT1 and T2 capital plus qualifying ‘intermediate’ debt) must function ‘back to 
front’. Investors need to know, not only that they will be subject to loss, but what they 
might recover or at least the process by which they might recover some of their investment. 
The closer resolution gets to normal insolvency procedures the better the ‘back’ end of the 
instrument will function and the easier it will be to place the obligations with investors at 
the ‘front’.  
In practical terms this means using the a priori valuation at the PONV to determine how far 
up the creditor hierarchy bail-in should extend; issuing receiver certificates to each class of 
liabilities subject to bail-in; and allocating any excess cash flow generated by the bank-in-
                                                   
76  Article 27(1)(h) empowers the supervisor to acquire, including through on-site inspections and 
provide to the resolution authority, all the information necessary in order to update the resolution plan 
and prepare for the possible resolution of the institution and for valuation of the assets and liabilities of 
the institution in accordance with Article 36, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN). 
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resolution to creditors according to strict seniority (whilst treating creditors within each 
class equally). In addition, resolution authorities should seek to accord creditors during the 
restructuring phase some or all of the rights that creditors would have under normal 
insolvency procedures.  
From a legislative perspective, consideration should be given to harmonising the credit 
hierarchy across member states so as to create an ‘intermediate’ class of obligations that are 
senior to subordinated debt but junior to operating liabilities, such as deposits and 
derivatives. This class would qualify as MREL. 
3. Maintain continuity. In addition to requiring banks to take steps to maintain continuity of 
services, authorities should take steps to assure that a bank-in-resolution retains its 
authorisation(s) and license(s) and continues to have access to FMIs.  
4. Look after liquidity: Central banks should lend to solvent banks in viable condition on the basis of 
sound collateral. Concretely put, central banks should refrain from offering to finance banks 
where shortfalls in capital have driven the bank to the PONV. There should be no 
forbearance. Banks reaching the PONV should be put into resolution, not given ELA. To 
facilitate such an outcome, responsibility for emergency liquidity assistance within the 
eurozone should be transferred to the ECB from national central banks. As an input to such 
a decision, the Single Supervisory Board should provide an opinion to the Governing 
Council of the ECB regarding the distressed bank’s viability. 
Conversely, once the bank-in-resolution has been recapitalised, it should have access to 
liquidity upon the security of sound collateral. Ideally, the recapitalised bank would be 
able to obtain such funding from private sources. Practically, however, it will not be able 
to do so unless it has the same access to central bank facilities as other banks. Denying the 
recapitalised bank access to such a backstop hardly inspires market confidence. Allowing 
such access signals to the market that the recapitalised bank again meets the minimum 
standards for authorisation. 
To facilitate access to liquidity, banks will need to keep track of their unencumbered assets 
as well as be able to value and pledge such assets to potential (official and/or private) 
liquidity providers. 
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Annex 1. National competent (supervisory) and national resolution 
authorities 
Member state Supervisory authority Resolution authority 
Austria 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank in 
cooperation with  
Financial Market Authority 
 
Financial Market Authority 
Belgium 
Financial Services and Markets 
Authority National Bank of Belgium 
National Bank of Belgium Resolution College (part of National Bank of Belgium) 
Bulgaria Financial Supervision Commission Bulgarian National Bank 
Croatia Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency (HANFA) Croatian National Bank 
Cyprus 
National Bank of Cyprus 
National Bank of Cyprus Cyprus Securities and Exchange 
Commission 
Czech 
Republic 
Czech National Bank 
Czech National Bank 
Ministry of Finance 
Denmark Danish Financial Supervisory Authority / Finanstilsynet Financial Stability Company 
Estonia 
Financial Supervision Authority Ministry of Finance 
Eesti Pank  
Finland 
Financial Supervisory Authority Suomen Pankki / Bank of Finland 
Suomen Pankki / Bank of Finland  
France Autorite des Marche Financiers Autorite de Controle Prudentiel et de Resolution 
Germany 
BaFin Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilisation (FMSA) 
Bundesbank  
Greece 
Department for the Supervision of 
Credit and Financial Institutions of the 
Bank of Greece 
Bank of Greece -- Resolution Measures 
Committee 
Hungary Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of 
Hungary) 
Ireland Central Bank of Ireland 
Prudential Analytics & Resolutions 
Division within the Central Bank 
Ministry of Finance 
Italy Bank of Italy Bank of Italy 
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Member state Supervisory authority Resolution authority 
Latvia Financial and Capital Market 
Commission  Bank of Latvia 
Lithuania Lietuvos Bankas 
Lietuvos Bankas 
Ministry of Finance 
Luxembourg Commission de Surveillance du 
Secteur Financier 
Not formally recognised by Luxembourg 
law (see notes) 
Malta Malta Financial Services Authority 
Central Bank of Malta 
Central Bank of Malta 
Netherlands Autoriteit Financiële Markten 
De Nederlandsche Bank 
De Nederlandsche Bank 
Poland Polish Financial Supervision 
Authority (KNF) Bank Guarantee Fund 
Portugal Banco de Portugal Banco de Portugal 
Romania Banca Nationala a Romaniei (NBR) 
Banca Nationala a Romaniei (NBR) Financial Supervisory Authority 
(CNVM) 
Slovakia Národná Banka Slovenska (Central 
Bank) Národná Banka Slovenska 
Slovenia Banka Slovenije 
Banka Slovenije 
Securities Market Agency (A-TVP) 
Spain Banco de España 
Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada 
Bancaria Comisión Nacional del Mercado de 
Valores 
Sweden Finansinspektionen Riksgalden (Swedish National Debt Office) 
UK Prudential Regulation Authority Bank of England 
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Annex 2. Rights of holders of receivership certificates 
To limit the possible amount of NCWO-claims for the resolution funds it may make sense to 
accord creditors some of the same rights that they would ordinarily enjoy in a bankruptcy 
proceeding for a non-financial corporation. Hence, the investors may receive receivership 
certificates during the stabilisation phase. These rights might include: 
 The right of first refusal with respect to any significant sale of assets, line of business, 
material subsidiary or the firm as a whole. This would serve as a check on the 
resolution authority’s selling such assets or entities at a fire sale price to the detriment 
of the creditors. This right would be exercised by class of creditor starting with the 
most senior and progressing to more junior categories, finishing with common equity. 
 The right to use receivership certificates as the means of payment in connection with 
disposals by the bank-in-resolution either in connection with an original bid or in 
exercising their right of first refusal. Effectively, creditors could offer to exchange their 
claims on the estate of the bank-in-resolution for some portion of the bank’s assets or 
business.  
 The right of a junior class of creditors to buy out the next most senior class of creditors 
at par plus accrued interest. Such an offer satisfies the claim of the more senior class in 
full and allocates to the more junior class the ownership rights that the more senior 
class might have obtained. 
 The right of a creditor class to present a plan for reorganisation of the bank-in-
resolution (formation of Newco) that would:  
o provide for repayment in full of any official liquidity facility granted to the 
bank-in-resolution; 
o assure that Newco meets capital and liquidity requirements; including any 
requirement for reserve capital; 
o assure that the management and directors of Newco were fit and proper;  
o evidence that Newco has a sound, sustainable business model and 
o have the concurrence of other classes of creditors. 
In sum, such a reorganisation plan should demonstrate that Newco meets threshold 
conditions. To the extent that such a plan involves the infusion of additional cash (e.g. to fund 
the issuance of additional capital instruments and/or to serve as a cash alternative to any 
exchange offer that might be made), the plan should be fully and unconditionally 
underwritten. 
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